

Can LLMs Deceive CLIP?

Benchmarking Adversarial Compositionality of Pre-trained Multimodal Representation via Text Updates

ACL 2025
VIENNA

(* Equal Contribution)

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Intro: Pre-trained Multimodal Representations

- They encode rich information from **different modalities**

- Cross-modality

- *Image-Language*: CLIP, SigLIP, BLIP, ...
 - *Video-Language*: VideoCLIP, Frozen in Time, ...
 - *Audio-Language*: CLAP, ...


- Multimodality

- $\{\text{Language, Video, Audio, Depth, Thermal, IMU}\}$ -Image: ImageBind, ...
 - $\{\text{Video, Audio, Depth, Thermal}\}$ -Language: LanguageBind, ...

- Widespread applications across

- *retrieval*
 - *generation*
 - *reward modeling*

...



(image credit: LanguageBind)

Intro: Compositional Vulnerability

- Contrary to the belief, these representations are known to be **brittle**
 - Intuitively exemplified by **compounding text elements**
 - *e.g.*, CLIP got confused by *simple negation* or *object swapping*
 - Usually explored in *vision-language compositionality*^[1,2,3] domain



A man sitting on a bench next to a horse

(Negation) A man **not** sitting on a bench next to a horse

(Swap) A man sitting on a **horse** next to a **bench**

(Replace) A man standing on a bench next to a horse

(Add) A man sitting on a bench next to a horse, **while drinking a glass of water**

...

[1] Thrush et al., *Winoground: Probing Vision and Language Models for Visio-Linguistic Compositionality*, CVPR 2022

[2] Ma et al., *CREPE: Can Vision-Language Foundation Models Reason Compositionally?*, CVPR 2023

[3] Bansal et al., *VideoCon: Robust Video-Language Alignment via Contrast Captions*, CVPR 2024

Motivation: “Diverse” Compositional Vulnerabilities

- Existing studies are limited to **specific modalities**
 - (Mostly) *Image-Language compositionality* ^[1]
 - *Video-Language compositionality* ^[2]
 - (Few) *Audio-Language compositionality* ^[3]
- They usually assume **specific scenarios** (*negation, swap, ...*)

→ Comprehensive understanding of **diverse** compositional vulnerabilities, **without assuming specific scenarios**, remain an open challenge

[1] Yuksekgonul et al., *When and why vision-language models behave like bags-of-words, and what to do about it?*, ICLR 2023


[2] Park et al., *Exposing the Limits of Video-Text Models through Contrast Sets*, NAACL 2022

[3] Ghosh et al., *CompA: Addressing the Gap in Compositional Reasoning in Audio-Language Models*, ICLR 2024

The MAC Benchmark

- We propose **M**ultimodal **A**dversarial **C**ompositionality (**MAC**) benchmark
 - Given multimodal data pairs (e.g., image-caption)


1. **Generate** deceptive captions (via rule-based, LLM, etc)
2. **Evaluate** whether generated captions successfully deceive target representations
 - Sample-wise Eval
 - Group-wise Eval



The MAC Benchmark: Problem Definition

1. Generation

- We use **text updates** due to **modality-agnostic** assessment
- Given a set of paired data $D = (t_i, x_i)_{i=1}^{M_D}$, we aim to generate a set of adversarial text $\{\tilde{t}_i\}_{i=1}^{M_D}$ that deceives a target representation f , which encodes both t_i and x_i into embeddings $y_{t_i}, y_{x_i} = f(t_i, x_i) \in \mathbf{R}^d$
- Two key components
 - Adversarial sample “generator” g produces N samples $\{\tilde{t}_i^n\}_{n=1}^N$
 - Sample “filterer” h identifies a single $\tilde{t}_i$ from N candidates



The MAC Benchmark: Problem Definition


2. Evaluation

- **Sample-wise Deception Evaluation**

1. **Cross-modal criterion (s_i^c):** Generated sample should achieve the intended attack
2. **Uni-modal criterion (s_i^u):** Meaningful semantic distinction btw generated & original text
3. **Distance criterion (s_i^d):** Only limited lexical deviation from the original sample
4. **Auxiliary criterion (s_i^a):** Whether a generated sample follows a set of predefined rules

In total, the **attack success rate (ASR)** R is

$$R = \frac{1}{M_D} \sum_i (s_i^c, s_i^u, s_i^d, s_i^a)$$




The MAC Benchmark: Problem Definition

2. Evaluation


- **Group-wise Diversity Evaluation**

- Another crucial criterion? → **Diversity**
 - Repeated & similar attack is **easily defendable** & **lacks generalizability**
- First, construct a set of “attribute-enhanced token” e_i^j , defined as OP_POS_LEMMA
- Using a set of tokens, compute **entropy** $H = -\sum_j p_j \log p_j$
 - Additionally, we use **distinct-1** = $\frac{\text{\# unique attribute-enhanced tokens}}{\text{\# all attribute-enhanced tokens}}$



The MAC Benchmark: Overall

- Key advantages
 - **Modality-agnostic:** Applied to any formats (image, video, audio)
 - **Leaderboard:** Existing compositionality frameworks can be consistently compared
 - **Comprehensive eval:** Assess both deception and attack diversity



Approach: Motivation

- Among diverse **generators g** , we prioritize **LLM-based** methods

- Rule-based
 - produce **nonsensical** & **non-fluent** text
- Human-based
 - **difficult to scale**
- **LLM-based**
 - generate fluent text at scale
 - Recent studies adopted LLM-based > Rule & Human-based

Method	Modality	Generation	Crossmodal	Diversity
RoCOCO ^[1]		Rule-based	✓	
Winoground ^[2]		Human	✓	
SugarCrepe ^[3]		ChatGPT	✓	
VIOLIN ^[4]		Human	✓	
VideoCon ^[5]		PaLM-2	✓	
CompA ^[6]		GPT-4	✓	
MAC	  	Llama3-8B	✓	✓

[1] Park et al., *RoCOCO: Robustness Benchmark of MS-COCO to Stress-Test Image-Text Matching Models*, ECCV 2024 Workshop

[2] Thrush et al., *Winoground: Probing Vision and Language Models for Visio-Linguistic Compositionality*, CVPR 2022

[3] Hsieh et al., *SugarCrepe: Fixing Hackable Benchmarks for Vision-Language Compositionality*, NeurIPS 2023

[4] Liu et al., *Violin: A Large-Scale Dataset for Video-and-Language Inference*, CVPR 2020

[5] Park et al., *VideoCon: Robust Video-Language Alignment via Contrast Captions*, CVPR 2024


[6] Ghosh et al., *CompA: Addressing the Gap in Compositional Reasoning in Audio-Language Models*, ICLR 2024

Approach: Preliminary

- Revealing Compositional Vulnerabilities via **Filtering f**
 - Multiple attempt ($N > 1$): effective than $N = 1$
 - Best-of- N sampling
 - Given N samples $\{\tilde{t}_i^n\}_{n=1}^N$, sample deceptive one first; otherwise randomly sample

$$T_i = \{\tilde{t}_i^n | (s_i^c \cdot s_i^u \cdot s_i^d \cdot s_i^a)(\tilde{t}_i^n, t_i, x_i) = 1\},$$
$$\tilde{t}_i \sim \begin{cases} \text{Uniform}(T_i), & \text{if } T_i \neq \emptyset, \\ \text{Uniform}(\{\tilde{t}_i^n\}_{n=1}^N), & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

- Pros: ASR $\uparrow$
- Cons:
 - computational cost **scales linearly** with N
 - Larger N **masks true effectiveness** of adversarial strategies (*i.e.*, brute-force)




Approach: Self-training

- We propose a **learnable** method for the first time
 - Given the absence of ground-truth, we employ **self-training**
 - or **rejection sampling fine-tuning (RFT)**
 - From the training set $D_{\text{train}} = (t_i, x_i)_{i=1}^{M_{D_{\text{train}}}}$,
 - We first generate & filter samples $\{\tilde{t}_i^n\}_{n=1}^N$ using best-of- N sampling
 - Then only use $M_{\hat{D}}$ successful adversarial samples to train the model

$$\{\tilde{t}_i\}_{n=1}^{M_{\hat{D}}} = \{\tilde{t}_i^n | s_i^c \cdot s_i^u \cdot s_i^d \cdot s_i^a = 1\},$$

$$\mathcal{L} = -\frac{1}{M_{\hat{D}}} \sum_i \sum_j \log g(\tilde{t}_{i,j} | \tilde{t}_{i,<j}, I, t_i; \Theta)$$

+ To further enhance ASR, we use large- N distilled self-training



Approach: “Diversity-promoting” Self-training

- Despite high ASR, naïve self-training **decreases diversity**
- To enhance diversity:
 - Introduce **Gibbs sampling-based train data selection**
 - Motivation: Iteratively selects samples that maximizes diversity

Algorithm 1 Diversity-promoting Self-training Data Selection

Require: Set of N samples $\{\tilde{t}_i^n\}_{n=1}^N$ generated for each training instance $i \in [1, M_{\hat{D}}]$, and diversity function H

Ensure: Diverse successful samples $\{\tilde{t}_i\}_{i=1}^{M_{\hat{D}}}$
 Initialize $\{\tilde{t}_i\}_{i=1}^{M_{\hat{D}}}$ randomly from $\{\tilde{t}_i^n | (s_i^c \cdot s_i^u \cdot s_i^d \cdot s_i^a)(\tilde{t}_i^n, t_i, x_i) = 1\}$

for iteration $k = 1$ to K **do**

for $i = 1$ to $M_{\hat{D}}$ **do**


$\mathcal{T}_i \leftarrow \{\tilde{t}_i^n | (s_i^c \cdot s_i^u \cdot s_i^d \cdot s_i^a)(\tilde{t}_i^n, t_i, x_i) = 1\}$

$\tilde{t}_i \leftarrow \operatorname{argmax}_{\tilde{t}_i^n \in \mathcal{T}_i} H(\tilde{t}_1, \dots, \tilde{t}_i^n, \dots, \tilde{t}_{M_{\hat{D}}})$

end for

end for

return $\{\tilde{t}_i\}_{i=1}^{M_{\hat{D}}}$



Experiments: Evaluation Protocol

- Target representations: CLIP, LanguageBind
 - + SigLIP, NegCLIP, BLIP, CLAP, LLaVA
- Source datasets: MS-COCO (image), MSRVT (video), AudioCaps (audio)
- Generator LLM: Llama-3.1-8B
 - Prompt version
 - *deceptive-specific*: *replace*, *swap*, and *add* operations
 - *deceptive-general* (default): no constraints
- Evaluation metrics
 - Sample-wise: ASR (%)
 - Group-wise: Diversity (H)

Experiments: Results (1)

- Existing methods
 - Single modality
- ASR vs. Diversity
- ASR: $N = 4 > N = 1$
- Ablation
 - + Self-train
 - ASR $\uparrow$ (+68% on avg)
 - Reduce diversity
 - + Large- N Distilled
 - Further ASR $\uparrow$
 - Reduce diversity
 - + Diversity-Promoted
 - Pareto front in ASR-diversity

Method	Image (CLIP/COCO)		Video (LB/MSRVT)		Audio (LB/AudioCaps)	
	ASR (%)	Diversity (H)	ASR (%)	Diversity (H)	ASR (%)	Diversity (H)
$N = 1$						
RoCOCO _{rand-voca}	1.99	<u>7.64</u>	-	-	-	-
RoCOCO _{Danger}	7.88	4.45	-	-	-	-
RoCOCO _{same-concept}	5.29	7.10	-	-	-	-
RoCOCO _{diff-concept}	2.75	7.13	-	-	-	-
SugarCrepe	2.40	7.31	-	-	-	-
VideoCon	-	-	7.10	6.70	-	-
Deceptive-General Prompt (zero-shot)	6.88	7.56	7.70	6.81	10.47	<u>6.57</u>
$N = 4$						
SeeTrue	23.33	7.17	-	-	-	-
VFC	-	-	36.90	5.93	-	-
CompA	-	-	-	-	5.76	6.01
(1) Deceptive-General Prompt (zero-shot)	19.19	7.57	24.80	6.81	29.02	6.57
(2): (1) + Self-Train	34.64	7.51	39.70	<u>6.90</u>	47.35	6.47
(3): (2) + Large- N Distilled	<u>42.03</u>	7.45	<u>44.20</u>	6.84	<u>51.57</u>	6.51
(4): (3) + Diversity-Promoted (ours)	42.10	7.75	45.60	7.13	52.87	6.87

Experiments: Results (2)

- Transferability across representations
 - High transferability, exceeding the best performing baseline (23.33)
 - Performance gains from self-training: 2.1x improvements

ASR (%)	CLIP	SigLIP	NegCLIP	BLIP
CLIP	42.10 (+22.91)	28.63 (+15.68)	24.84 (+12.71)	25.25 (+14.13)
SigLIP	29.37 (+16.13)	41.04 (+21.32)	23.84 (+12.17)	25.01 (+13.76)
NegCLIP	25.40 (+12.68)	23.63 (+11.47)	40.81 (+20.10)	23.77 (+12.33)
BLIP	19.84 (+10.60)	19.11 (+10.04)	18.02 (+8.94)	32.50 (+17.80)


[Columns: source models for filtering

Rows: target models for evaluation

Numbers in parentheses: gain from ours vs. zero-shot]


Experiments: Analysis (1)

- Multi-round self-training
 - Further improves ASR, reaching saturation by 3rd round
 - Ours continuously improve diversity




Experiments: Analysis (2)

- Influence of N in large- N distilled self-training
 - Increasing N does not display a clear signal of saturation
 - Still, $\Delta\text{ASR}/\Delta N$ does $\rightarrow N = 64$ offers a reasonable balance




Experiments: Analysis (3)

- Human evaluation
 - Confirms reliability of evaluation of uni-modal criteria (s_i^u)



Experiments: Qualitative Examples

	<u>Cross</u>	<u>Uni</u>	<u>Dist</u>	
  <i>A lady walking in the rain carrying a pink umbrella</i>				(Zero-shot) A lady dancing in the rain carrying a pink umbrella
				(Self-train) A lady walking in the rain under a broken pink umbrella
				(Ours) A lady walking in the rain with her pink umbrella left behind
  <i>A person is looking at a camera during a wrestling event</i>				(Zero-shot) A person is intensely staring at a camera during a dramatic wrestling event
				(Self-train) A person is smiling at a camera during a wrestling event
				(Ours) A person is looking directly at the referee during a wrestling event
  <i>A female speaking with some rustling followed by another female speaking</i>				(Zero-shot) The female is speaking with some rustling but the other voice is a male
				(Self-train) A female speaking with some rustling, followed by a male speaking
				(Ours) A female speaking with some rustling followed by the same female speaking again

Concluding Remarks

- MAC: Comprehensive testbed for evaluating compositional vulnerabilities
 - Evaluate ASR & diversity of LLM-generated outputs
 - Modality-agnostic assessment
- Diversity-promoted self-training
 - LLM-based self-training for MAC
 - Iterative RFT w/ diversity-promoting filtering: improve both ASR & diversity
- Potential extension of vulnerability analysis
 - Less-explored modalities (IMU, tactile, ...)

Thank you

Code	<u>https://github.com/ahnjaewoo/MAC</u>
Paper	<u>https://arxiv.org/abs/2505.22943</u>
Contact	<u>jaewoo.ahn@vision.snu.ac.kr</u> , <u>heeseung.yun@vision.snu.ac.kr</u>